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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900214-CA 
v. i Priority No. 2 
RODNEY W. SMITH, 1 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of a 
key prosecution witness's prior felony convictions under Rule 609 
and Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
2. Did the trial court err in excluding certain 
hearsay testimony of a defense witness? 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that "[w]hether 
a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we 
always review questions of law under a correctness standard." 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rodney W. Smith, was charged with theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 6).1 
Prior to the jury trial November 2, 1989, defense 
counsel inquired of the trial court whether he could introduce 
evidence of a prosecution witness's two prior convictions for 
felony theft, as well as an apparent prior misdemeanor conviction 
for falsification of a driver's license (Transcript of jury 
selection, November 2, 1989 [hereinafter J.S.] at 63). The trial 
court ruled that defense counsel would be allowed to inquire 
concerning the criminal record of prosecution witness, Scott T. 
Davidson (J.S. at 76). Specifically, the court ruled defense 
counsel could "inquir[e] in front of the jury about the driver's 
license matter and he can inquire about the burglary,2 for the 
purpose of probing whether or not Mr. Davidson was a planner and 
a leader on that" (J.S. at 76). Apparently, the trial court 
based its ruling on both Rule 609 and Rule 404, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (J.S. at 78). Subsequently, prior to Davidson 
testifying, the trial court altered its previous ruling, deciding 
that defense counsel could not inquire concerning the burglary 
1
 Defendant was originally charged with the additional 
offense of receiving stolen property, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990) (R. at 6, 10). However, that charge was 
subsequently dropped (R. at 30, 34). 
2
 The trial court apparently mispoke, referring to 
Davidson's 1985 felony theft conviction as a burglary (J.S. at 
76). Davidson characterized the conviction as a burglary in his 
testimony before the court (J.S. at 72-73). 
-2-
incident for the purpose of showing that Davidson was a "leader" 
(Transcript of jury trial, November 2, 1989 [hereinafter T.] at 
44-47). The court further noted that he had nothing before him 
which indicated that it would be appropriate for defense counsel 
to bring out Davidson's felony convictions relating to 
credibility (T. at 47). The trial court's ruling allowing 
inquiry concerning Davidson's conviction for falsification of a 
driver's license remained unchanged (T. at 47).3 
Following the conclusion of the trial, November 2, 
1989, defendant was convicted as charged (R. at 30). The trial 
court subsequently sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah 
State Prison of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years, which sentence was to run concurrently with the sentence 
defendant was then serving. Defendant received credit for time 
served (R. at 59). 
On November 13, 1989, defendant filed a motion for new 
trial (R. at 64). The trial court denied defendant's motion in 
part and took it under advisement in part on December 18, 1989 
(R. at 77). The portion of the motion for new trial previously 
taken under advisement was subsequently denied in an order filed 
March 26, 1990 (R. at 84). 
3
 During the course of the trial, prior to defendant 
testifying, the trial court similarly ruled that the prosecutor 
would not be allowed to inquire concerning defendant's criminal 
record "for essentially the same reason that I will not allow the 
same thing with respect to Mr. Davidson, and this under Rule 609 
of the recent rules by the Supreme Court" (T. at 95). 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of August 17, 1989/ defendant, Rodney W. 
Smith, and a friend, Scott E. Montoya, drove to Hot Water 
Products (HWP)A in Midvale, Utah (Transcript of trial, November 
2, 1989 [hereinafter T.] at 92, 97-100, testimony of Montoya; T. 
at 114, testimony of defendant). Observing no one on the 
premises, the two men removed an approximately 7' square, pre-
plumbed, Hawaiian style spa, worth approximately $1600 - $1900, 
from a trailer inside the enclosed yard of HWP and loaded it into 
their vehicle (T. at 31, 100, 115-116). 
Having previously ascertained that a co-w.orker, Scott 
T. Davidson, was interested in purchasing a hot tub, defendant 
and Montoya drove to a pay phone in the vicinity of Murray High 
School where defendant placed a call to Davidson informing him he 
had a hot tub for sale (T. at 51-52, testimony of Davidson; 101, 
testimony of Montoya; 116-117, testimony of defendant). The two 
men then delivered the spa to Davidson at his home in Murray (T. 
at 51-52, testimony of Davidson; T. at 101, testimony of Montoya; 
T. at 117, testimony of defendant).5 
On the afternoon of August 18, 1989, Arthur Kessinger, 
4
 HWP is a wholesale distributor of bathtubs, spas, 
chemicals and accessories (T. at 10). 
5
 Both defendant and Montoya testified that Davidson met 
them at Murray High School and then directed them to his 
(Davidson's) home (T. at 101, testimony of Montoya; 117, 
testimony of defendant). Davidson, on the other hand, testified 
that defendant called him at home between 5;00-6:30 p.m., and 
told him he had a hot tub (T. at 51). When Davidson told 
defendant that he would "like to take a look" at the hot tub, 
defendant said he would bring it right over (T. at 52). 
-4-
president of HWP, noticed that a spa was missing from a trailer 
parked inside HWP's enclosed storage yard (T. at 32, 38), After 
determining that the spa had not been sold, Kessinger reported 
the theft to the Midvale Police Department (T. at 33, 41). When 
HWP employees attempted to lock up that evening they discovered 
that one of the chain links on the lock had been cut (T. at 14, 
36). One of the employees reported that the gate was unlocked 
when he arrived for work that morning (T. at 13-14). Kessinger 
discovered part of the cut link as he was looking around the yard 
after the theft had been discovered (T. at 14-15, 36). 
Kessinger and his employees contacted several of their 
competitors in the area to inform them of the stolen hot tub (T. 
at 34). Subsequently, a local dealer called HWP and reported 
that they had received a phone call from a person inquiring about 
an equipment package and engine for a hot tub (T. at 34, 
testimony of Kessinger; T. at 55, testimony of Davidson). 
Apparently Davidson called several dealers inquiring about spa 
equipment the day after defendant delivered the hot tub to his 
home (T. at 55). An HWP employee, representing himself as a 
service person, went to Davidson's home and verified that the hot 
tub was the one reported missing from HWP (T. at 34, testimony of 
Kessinger; T. at 55-56, testimony of Davidson). 
Detective Scott Hodgkinson of the Midvale Police 
Department assisted in the investigation of the stolen hot tub 
(T. at 68). He interviewed Davidson on the evening of August 21, 
1989, at which time Davidson said that defendant had approached 
-5-
him about buying a hot tub for $500 on Thursday or Friday of the 
previous week (T. at 72). 
Detective Hodgkinson them talked to defendant the next 
morning, August 22, 1989, when defendant arrived for work at 
Weber Brother's Construction Company (T. at 73). Defendant 
initially denied involvement in the theft and refused to say more 
until he talked to "somebody else" (T. at 74-75). After 
Detective Hodgkinson arrested defendant, defendant said, "Let's 
go somewhere and talk" (T. at 75). Detective Hodgkinson 
proceeded to the Salt Lake City Complex where defendant told him 
that Davidson had asked him to pick up the hot tub (T. at 76). 
When Detective Hodgkinson informed defendant that he did not 
believe his story, defendant admitted that he had taken the hot 
tub and that somebody else was with him, but he wouldn't say who 
(T. at 76). Defendant further indicated that if Detective 
Hodgkinson would let him drive away, he would tell the "entire 
truth" (T. at 76-77). When Detective Hodgkinson informed 
defendant that he could not let him drive away, defendant said, 
"That's fine. Let's go to jail" (T. at 77). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the trial court erroneously 
excluded evidence of key prosecution witness, Scott T. 
Davidson's, prior felony convictions under Rule 609, Utah Rules 
of Evidence which expressly provides for the admission of a 
witness's prior felony convictions unless the probative value of 
admitting the convictions outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
-6-
defendant. The Utah rule is patterned after the federal rule 
which similarly limits the admissibility of such evidence only 
where it would prove unduly prejudicial to the defendant. 
Moreover, the trial court's error was not harmless because 
Davidson's testimony was the only evidence directly contradicting 
defendant's testimony concerning the requisite element of intent. 
Therefore, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the 
error, the outcome would have been more favorable for defendant. 
Thus, this case should be remanded for a new trial with direction 
to the trial court that Davidson's felony convictions are 
admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the scope of defense 
counsel's inquiry concerning Davidson's prior convictions on 
remand must be limited to the nature of the crime, the date of 
the conviction and the punishment. Although defendant asserts 
generally that inquiry concerning the details of at least one of 
the convictions is necessary to demonstrate Davidson's knowledge 
pursuant to Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, he has not 
established sufficient similarity or relation between the instant 
theft and Davidson's conviction to warrant admission of the 
conviction under the rule. In light of the clear admissibility 
of both convictions under Rule 609, any inquiry concerning the 
details of the convictions would be misleading, wasteful, and 
cumulative. Because evidence that goes to general disposition or 
is unfairly prejudicial is not admissible, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's refusal to admit the convictions under 
-7-
Rule 404(b). 
Finally, defendant waived consideration by this Court 
of the admissibility of hearsay testimony of defense witness, 
Scott E. Montoya, when he failed to make a proffer of the 
substantive content of the hearsay testimony or to provide the 
court with an express exception to the general rule prohibiting 
the admission of hearsay evidence when asked to do so by the 
trial court. Thus, on remand for new trial this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling insofar as it rests on the above 
grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO INQUIRE AS TO A KEY PROSECUTION 
WITNESS'S PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 
609 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR; HOWEVER, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO INQUIRE 
CONCERNING THE CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 4 04 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE WAS PROPER. 
Prior to the trial testimony of key prosecution 
witness, Scott T. Davidson, the trial court reversed its earlier 
ruling allowing defense counsel to inquire concerning Davidson's 
felony theft convictions under Rules 404 and 609 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence (T. at 44-47; See Addendum A). After further 
reflection on the matter, the trial court informed defense 
counsel that he had erroneously applied Rule 404 to the question 
of the admissibility of Davidson's felony theft convictions and 
that he would no longer permit defense counsel to inquire about 
Davidson's convictions for the improper purpose of "proving 
-8-
conformity" (T. at 45-46). Specifically, the trial court stated, 
"My ruling is changed in that you cannot inquire concerning the 
burglary incident for the purpose of showing that he's a leader" 
(T. at 46). 
As for Rule 609, the trial court noted the propriety of 
its application to the question of the admissibility of 
Davidson's felony convictions and informed defense counsel that 
"if [Davidson's] answers are sufficient that you can challenge 
his credibility because he testified falsely on credibility, 
absolutely you can go after him on credibility" (T. at 46). 
However, the court further advised defense counsel that because 
he had 
heard nothing from [Davidson's] testimony 
that would indicate that that burglary was of 
such a nature that it involved false 
statements indicating that his testimonial 
character is subject to challenge. And 
therefore, [he] [had] nothing in front of 
[him] right [then] to indicate that it would 
be appropriate for [defense counsel] to bring 
out his conviction on the burglary on the 
theft. 
(T. at 47). Thus, apparently, the trial court would allow 
inquiry concerning Davidson's prior felony theft convictions only 
if Davidson testified falsely concerning his involvement in the 
present case (T. at 46-47). The trial court's ruling reflects 
the belief that the protections afforded defendants under Rule 
609 apply equally to prosecution witnesses. However, a review of 
the express language of Rule 609, the advisory committee note 
thereto, and interpretative case law, suggests that the trial 
court's application of Rule 609 to the facts of this case was 
-9-
erroneous and that defense counsel should have been permitted to 
inquire concerning Davidson's prior felony convictions at trial, 
regardless of whether Davidson testified falsely concerning his 
involvement, 
A, The trial court's application of Rule 609 to 
evidence of Davidson's prior felony 
convictions was erroneous. 
Rule 609 provides in part that the credibility of a 
witness may be attacked by evidence that he has been convicted of 
a felony, "and the court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant." Utah R. Evid. 609(a) (emphasis added).'6 The 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 609 reiterates the above concern, 
noting that the Utah rule is the same as the federal rule in 
granting the court "discretion in convictions not involving 
dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if 
it would be prejudicial to the defendant" (emphasis added). The 
advisory committee further notes that "[c]urrent Utah law 
Specifically. Rule 609(a) provides: 
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
-10-
mandates the admission of such evidence."7 
Similarly, federal case law8 interpreting Rule 609 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, supports the view that all felony 
convictions are probative of credibility to some degree. United 
States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1056-1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Moreover, to the extent that a particular witness's felony 
conviction is only slightly probative of credibility, only the 
prejudicial effect to the defendant is to be weighed against 
probative value- Ld. at 1508 n.37, 1061 n.49 (citations 
omitted). This view is consistent with "'Congress' understanding 
that 'the prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness may 
always be used [because] [t]here can be no prejudicial effect to 
the defendant.'" JA. at 1058 n. 37 (citations omitted). For 
witnesses other than the accused "'the danger of prejudice . . . 
[is] outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much 
relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible.'" Id. 
at 1061; United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 n.21 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (quoting a Conference Committee member who told the 
House that "now a defendant can cross examine a government 
7
 See Boyce & Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 Part-II, 
1987 Utah L. Rev. 467, 492 n.127, 494 n.141 497 (noting that 
discretion should rarely be used to limit impeachment in a civil 
case or of a prosecution witness). 
8
 In State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), this Court recognized that because the Utah and federal 
rules are identical, Utah appellate courts look to federal cases 
in interpreting Rule 609. E.g. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 654 
(Utah 1989); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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witness about any of his previous felony convictions; he can 
always do it, because that will not prejudice him in anyway 
[sic], • • . Only the Government is going to be limited* . . . " 
120 Cong, Rec. H. 12,257), See United States v. Thome, 547 F.2d 
56 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). See also Campbell 
v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the only 
witness who may demand a balancing of the prejudicial value of 
his criminal record against its probative effect is the defendant 
in a criminal trial).9 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has 
similarly interpreted Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Green v. Rock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-511, 109 
S.Ct. 1981, 1984-85, 1991-92 (1989). The Green Court considered 
Rule 609 's application in a civil case and determined that trial 
courts must admit evidence of prior felony convictions to impeach 
a witness in a civil case "regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice 
to the witness or the party offering the testimony." JId. at 
1993. In so holding, the Court observed that "Rule 609(a)(l)'s 
9
 Cf.. United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 
1981). Relying on language in Smith, 551 F.2d at 360, and noting 
the that the burden of establishing the admissibility of a prior 
conviction rests on the proponent, Cunningham appears to assert 
that the admission of such evidence against a prosecution witness 
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ld. at 697-98. 
However, Cunningham ignores additional explanatory language in 
Smith that impeachment by prior convictions is regulated only 
where the defendant's interests might be prejudiced, "and not 
where the prosecution might suffer, or where a non-defendant 
witness complains of possible loss of reputation in the 
community." Smith, 551 F.2d at 359 n.21. 
-12-
textual limitation of the prejudice balance to criminal 
defendants resulted from deliberation not oversight; . . . 
[therefore, the conferees] intended that only the accused in a 
criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the 
balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)." JEd. at 1991. See 3 
Weinstein's Evidence, 609[06], at 609-109 (Supp. 1991).10 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the State concedes 
that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to 
inquire concerning Davidson's felony convictions under Rule 609; 
moreover, because Davidson was a critical prosecution witness, 
whose testimony was the only evidence directly contradicting 
defendant's testimony concerning the requisite element of intent, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the 
outcome would have been more favorable for defendant. State v. 
10
 Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence was recently 
amended, effective December 1, 1990, to provide for application 
of the "general balancing test of Rule 403 to protect all 
litigants against unfair impeachment of witnesses." JEd. at 5 
(Spec. Alert 1990): 
General rule. - For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an 
accused has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the 
crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment, in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, 
and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted 
if the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
-13-
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). Thus, this case should be remanded 
for a new trial with direction to the trial court that Davidson's 
felony convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609. However, contrary to defendant's apparcmt assertion, 
the scope of his inquiry concerning Davidson's felony convictions 
must be limited to "the nature of the crime, the date of the 
conviction and the punishment." State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 
822 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that prior convictions solicited 
under Rule 609(a) are considered only for impeachment purposes). 
B. Defendant's inquiry on remand is properly 
limited solely to Rule 609 impeachment 
purposes and he may not inquire into 
Davidson's prior felony convictions under 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court's refusal to 
allow defense counsel to inquire concerning Davidson's felony 
convictions under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence was 
error because Davidson's "felony theft conviction concerning the 
camper shells . . . [demonstrates] that in following the plans of 
others in that criminal enterprise, [] Davidson [] learned how to 
plan a crime to be committed by others." Defendant further 
asserts that defense counsel was attempting to show Davidson's 
"knowledge," and not his "conformity" with past conduct (Br. of 
App. at 18). Although Rule 404(b) provides for the admission of 
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" of a person to 
establish "knowledge," it expressly prohibits the admission of 
such evidence "to prove the character of a person in order to 
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show . . • . [action] in conformity therewith."11 Because 
defendant has not sufficiently established that Davidson's felony 
conviction for theft of a camper shell goes to his "knowledge" in 
the present case, or serves any other proper purpose under Rule 
404(b), his argument concerning the admissibility of Davidson's 
felony conviction under the rule is without merit. 
Defendant appears to assert that evidence concerning 
the details of Davidson's theft of a camper shell is admissible 
under Rule 404(b) because the details of that theft are arguably 
similar to the details of the instant theft and thus demonstrate 
that Davidson could have planned the theft of the hot tub (Br. of 
App. 18).12 However, defendant offers only general allegations 
11
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
12
 In support of his argument, defendant further asserts 
that several federal courts apply a relaxed standard to evidence 
sought to be admitted by defendants under Rule 404(b), Federal 
Rules of Evidence. United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 776 
(11th Cir. 1990) (standard for admission of bad conduct evidence 
is relaxed when offered by defendant); United States v. 
Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2nd Cir. 1984) (standard of 
admission need not be as restrictive when defendant offers 
similar acts evidence). Admittedly, the Utah rule is based on 
the federal version of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, federal case 
law interpreting that rule is persuasive here. However, unlike 
Rule 609, Rule 404(b) does not contain express language limiting 
concerns about possible prejudicial effect to the defendant only. 
Also, the Utah appellate courts have not expressly stated a clear 
intention to follow federal case law in interpreting the Utah 
-15-
that Davidson knew how to ask other people to steal for him (Br. 
of App. at 18). There is no specific evidence of how that may 
have occurred in this case, nor evidence that identical tactics 
were employed. United States v. Rodriguez, 917 F.2d 1286, 1289 
(11th Cir. 1990). See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 
426 (Utah 1989). Moreover, while defendant claims to have been 
duped into stealing the hot tub, Davidson at no time alleged that 
he was duped into stealing the camper shell (J.S. at 74-75; See 
Addendum B). Absent such specificity and similarity, defendant 
has not established that the manner in which these two entirely 
separate and unrelated crimes were committed is admissible to 
show Davidson's knowledge of the instant theft under Rule 404(b). 
Rodriguez, 917 F.2d at 1289 (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 
404(b) which constituted nothing more than general allegation 
entirely lacking in specificity). 
version of Rule 404(b). 
Furthermore, although several federal courts may apply 
a relaxed standard regarding the admission of Rule 404(b) 
evidence against a prosecution witness, the evidence must still 
meet the general balancing test of Rule 403, Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Cohen, 888 F.2d at 776 (where proffered evidence is 
shown to have a special relevance to a disputed issue, trial 
court must still balance the probative value against the 
possibility of unfair prejudice); Aboumoussa11em, 726 F.2d at 912 
(in upholding trial court's refusal to admit evidence otherwise 
admissible under Rule 404(b), court noted that relevant evidence 
may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed). In any event, defendant's analysis is 
simply insufficient to demonstrate that admission of Davidson's 
previous involvement in the theft of a camper shell is either 
relevant or admissible, even under a relaxed standard of 
admissibility. 
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Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that 
evidence will not be admitted under Rule 404(b) 
merely because it shows a common plan, 
scheme, or manner of operation. Instead, 
evidence of a common plan, scheme, or manner 
of operation is admitted where it tends to 
prove some fact material to the crime 
charged. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426, Although Featherson dealt with the 
usual situation where the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence 
of the accused's conduct on another occasion, defendant has not 
established that proof of Davidson's prior theft of a camper 
shell tends to either prove or, in this case, disprove "some fact 
material to the crime charged." Moreover, the admissibility of 
"prior bad act evidence" under Utah's Rule 404(b), like its 
federal counterpart, is subject to the general balancing test of 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.13 Id; State v. Gotschall, 782 
P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989) (noting that Rule 4 04(b) does not end 
the analysis because evidence otherwise admissible under the rule 
is still subject to exclusion under Rule 403 which provides the 
trial court discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence 
when its potential for unfair prejudice outweighs its 
probativeness). Thus, even assuming that the mere fact of 
13
 Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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Davidson's theft of the camper shell is sufficient under a 
relaxed standard to establish evidence of a "common plan, scheme, 
or manner of operation" in the present case, the evidence was 
properly excluded under Rule 403. Defendant simply has not and 
can not demonstrate sufficient similarity between the two crimes 
to establish Davidson's knowledge as to the theft in the present 
case. Because "[e]vidence that goes to general disposition or is 
unfairly prejudicial is not admissible," this Court should uphold 
the trial court's refusal to admit evidence concerning the 
details of Davidson's felony theft conviction under Rule 404(b). 
Id. at 427. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE WITNESS 
AND DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF THE 
ISSUE BY FAILING TO PROPERLY PRESERVE IT IN 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendant appears to assert that the trial court erred 
in refusing to allow defense witness, Scott E. Montoya, to 
testify concerning his recollection of a conversation he 
allegedly overheard between defendant and Davidson at the time 
the hot tub was delivered to Davidson's home (Br. of App. at 19). 
He asserts that because the testimony arguably would have 
impeached Davidson's credibility it was admissible under State v. 
Hutchinson, 655 P,2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982). However, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, the trial court never made a final ruling 
on the admissibility of Montoya's testimony; rather, the court 
asked defense counsel to provide him with an exception to the 
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general prohibition against the admission of hearsay testimony1* 
(T. at 103; See Addendum C). Although defense counsel argued 
generally that the evidence would go to Davidson's credibility, 
he informed the court that he did not know the content of 
Montoya's testimony and was thus unable to direct the court to a 
specific exception (T. at 103). 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in pertinent 
part that 
[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
and . . . . [i]n case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by offer 
or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). In light of defendant's failure to make 
known to the trial court the "substance" of Montoya's testimony 
concerning the he conversation he allegedly overheard between 
Davidson and defendant, it can not reasonably be argued that the 
trial court erred in refusing to admit the testimony. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986) (an erroneous exclusion of 
evidence will not be set aside unless a proffer of evidence 
appears of record, and the excluded evidence would probably have 
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict). See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 578 
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978); Bradley v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 
1A
 See Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided 
by law or by these rules. 
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1240, 1243 (Utah 1980). Moreover, by failing to make a proffer 
of the substantive content of Montoya's testimony or to provide 
the court with an express exception to Rule 802 when asked by the 
trial court, defendant has waived his right to claim error. 
Thus, on remand for a new trial, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling insofar as it rests on the above grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
remand this case for new trial with direction to the trial court 
that Davidson's prior felony convictions are admissible solely 
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609; thus, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's refusal to allow inquiry concerning the 
details of Davidson's felony theft convictions under Rule 404(b). 
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
excluding the hearsay testimony of Montoya because defendant 
failed to properly preserve the issue for review by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted thisczL)-. ^ aY °f MaY/ 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 THE COURT: I looked over the rules, and it 
2 appears to me if you want character evidence, we're talking 
3 about the character of Mr. Davidson. It's got to come in 
4 in certain ways. And the disclaimed way is proving conformity 
5 of his character with a particular incident on the date 
6 in question. I don't think you can do it. 
7 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, all I can do is say that -
8 and I believe this to be a sound statement of the law — 
9 if you call somebody as a witness, you vouch for their 
10 credibility, that it follows that someone who is a convicted 
1! felon or at least assignment of responsibility is his, that 
12 someone who has been convicted of a felony is less credible. 
13 And I think that is the rule, and that is you're entitled 
14 to inquire of someone who is a witness offered by the 
15 government. 
16 THE COURT: But when the government and the 
17 Supreme Court have ruled on these cases, they have ruled 
18 under Rule 609. They have not ruled under Rule 404, and 
19 they have addressed that very thing on credibility with 
20 respect to a defendant, and have addressed it only in context] 
21 of credibility and not in the context of Rule 404, prejudice 
22 if they had addressed it in the context of 
23 Rule 404, then I would say that there may be a different 
24 standard applicable to known defendant witnesses, because 
25 they have said the conviction of a crime does not reflect 
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1 generally upon credibility. 
2 MR. VAN SCIVER: If what I have interpreted, 
3 and I thought this was your ruling, Crime No. 1 in f85 is 
4 out, you couldn't inquire because it wasn't anything the 
5 finder of fact could determine from that and it would address! 
6 itself to just trying to discredit him. But that the other 
7 one, particularly if he contends that it's Smith's idea, 
8 can be inquired into. 
9 THE COURT: That was my original ruling. What 
10 I'm saying now, and that ruling was independent of credibility 
11 it was really directed to character. 
12 MR. VAN SCIVER: I think not. The latter, you 
13 almost have to wait and see what his answers are. 
14 THE COURT: Well, if his answers are sufficient 
15 that you can challenge his credibility because he testified 
16 falsely on credibility, absolutely you can go after him on 
17 credibility. But I don't think you can inquire about his 
18 propensity to be a leader in ill-gotten goods, because that 
19 was character evidence. 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: All right. 
21 THE'COURT: My ruling is changed in that you 
22 cannot inquire concerning the burglary incident for the 
23 purpose of showing that he's a leader. 
24 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I just, you know, that's 
25 fine. If we leave out the word leader, I don't know where 
46 
1 we'll go, and all I'm saying to you, thanks for the direction], 
2 but I think maybe it's a little premature to decide where 
3 I need to stop. 
4 THE COURT: Well — 
5 MR. VAN SCIVER: I'm not going to go over the 
6 line. 
7 THE COURT: I'm saying you're not going to be 
8 able to get into the proposition on the burglary that he's 
9 a leader, that leaves only the possibility of credibility. 
JO And I heard nothing from his testimony that would indicate 
11 that that burglary was of such a nature that it involved 
12 false statements indicating that his testimonial character 
13 is subject to challenge. And, therefore, I have nothing 
14 in front of me right now to indicate that it would be appropriate 
15 for you to bring out his conviction on the burglary on the 
16 theft. 
17 MR. VAN SCIVER: Okay. Okay. 
18 THE COURT: All right. So we're left only with 
19 the — 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: False driver's license. 
21 THE COURT: Right. And whether or not — how 
22 his deal in this case reflects upon his credibility. 
23 MR. VAN SCIVER: Right. All right. 
24 THE COURT: We'll take a short recess. 
25 [Whereupon, court was in recess at 2:50 p.m.] 
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1 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
2 MR. SKORDAS: Scott Davidson. 
3 
4 SCOTT DAVIDSON, 
5 called as a witness by the State of Utah, having been duly 
6 sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
7 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. SKORDAS: 
10 ft You realize you1 re still under oath. 
11 Scott, would you state your full name, please. 
12 A. Scott T. Davidson. 
13 ft Spell your last. 
14 A. D-a-v-i-d-s-o-n. 
15 ft Where do you work? 
16 A. Weber Brothers. 
17 ft Weber Brothers? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 ft What kind of business is that? 
20 A. Plastering company. 
21 ft Did you work there in August of this year? 
22 A. Yes, I did. 
23 ft Are you familiar with the defendant here? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 ft How do you know him? 
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ADDENDUM B 
Q. And was that ever revoked? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because of a theft. 
Q. Another theft? 
A. Yes. Over a carpenter shop. 
Q. You made a bunch of implicit promises in the 
probation agreement which you signed in writing. 
A. Yes. Yes, basically, probation agreement. 
10 I Q. And I suppose, by your actions, you lied? 
H A. No, I just didn't live up to the agreement that 
12 I had. 
13 I Q. When you signed it, you committed the next 
14 felony in that you promised not to violate the law? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. So by your actions, you lied. 
17 A. Technically, I guess. 
18 I MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, your Honor, I don't see 
19 where a violation of probation is a crime involving 
20 dishonesty. I don't know that in either case it's going 
21 to get any better than that sort of fabrication. 
22 Q* Run us quickly through the facts in number 
23 two. 
24 A. I got involved with some people that were 
25 I taking camper shells, and I got involved with them and I 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
took one myself with them. 1 
Q. Were there some parallels in that one and in 
this one? | 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
planned 
I don't understand what you mean. 1 
Who planned the taking of those? 
Another guy did. 
What role did you play? 
Mainly labor. 
What? 
Just labor. 
You got caught with the camper shell? 
Yes. 
THE COURT: What about the burglary? Who 
the burglary? 
THE WITNESS: Well, the other guys gave me the 
information on it, and the rest of it was up to me. 
the — 
wanted. 
and you 
Q. 
THE COURT: They gave you the information as to 
THE WITNESS: This place would have what they 
THE COURT: Then they gave you a grocery list 
were to go there and get it? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
(By Mr. Van Sciver) In terms of setting the 
time, determining when you were going to do it, who 
75 
ADDENDUM C 
1 ft And were there any markings on that tub that 
2 you can recall? 
3 A. There was a tag on it, a sold tag. That was 
4 all. Other than just the hot tub itself. 
5 Q. Did you see any signs of any kind on the fence? 
6 1 k No. 
1 Q. There wasn't anything on the fence? All right. 
ft Where did you go from there? 
9 1 A. We drove out to the street which was — the 
10 south I'm not sure, then headed east toward State Street 
11 and got to State Street and headed north towards Murray 
12 High School. 
13 ft All right. What was to be your destination? 
14 k We had to stop and make a phone call because 
15 Rodney didn't have the address to Scott's house. So he 
16 met us behind Murray High School and we followed him to 
17 his house from there. 
18 ft What occurred when you got to Mr. Davidson's 
19 house? 
20 I k I backed the truck to the side of his house 
21 and we unloaded it, and that was it. Put it in the back 
22 of his house, you know, behind the house. 
23 ft Were you present during any conversations between 
24 Mr. Smith and Mr. Davidson? 
25 k I was there the whole time, yes. 
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1 Q. What was discussed between you? 
2 J A. The only conversation — 
* MR. SKORDAS: I object. That was hearsay. 
* MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I suppose it could be 
5 an exception to hearsay, at least as to credibility, because 
^ it would be offered, arguably, against the interest of 
' both declarants. 
8
 THE COURT: Going on what was said? 
9
 MR. VAN SCIVER: *es. 
10 MR. SKORDAS: Well, it's not going to come out 
11 that way. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Credibility is not an 
13 exception to the hearsay rule. 
14 MR. VAN SCIVER: No, but being offered against — 
15 Q. Was there a conversation that you overheard? 
1* k Yes. 
17 Q, All right. Did you see anything exchange hands 
18 between the two gentlemen? 
19 A. No. 
20 QL When did you leave Mr. Davidson's premises? 
21 A. I don't know the exact time. We were probably 
22 there maybe 15 minutes. 
23 Q And, again, the time that you arrived at the 
24 yard where the tub was was when? 
25 k 1 would say about quarter to 6:00. In that 
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1 neighborhood. 
2 ft And when you arrived at Mr. Davidsonfs house? 
3 k Maybe five after 6:00. 
4 MR. VAN SCIVER: What's the ruling on this 
5 conversation? 
6 THE COURT: Well, I don't see how it fits into 
7 one of the exceptions for the availability of the declarants 
8 I mean/ maybe you can help me. Maybe it is — 
9 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I don't know what the 
10 conversation was, but I guess it can be offered to rebut 
11 what Mr. Davidson claimed the conversation was. Seems 
12 inappropriate that he can testify what it was and not 
13 Mr. Montoya. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I need to be — I need you 
15 to inform me of an exception. 
16 MR. VAN SCIVER: I don't know what the 
17 conversation was. 
18 Q. Was there a conversation of any length that 
19 you can recall? 
20 k Not a long period of time, no. 
21 ft Were you ever segregated from Mr. Smith and 
22 Mr. Davidson in any way? 
23 k No. 
24 ft And you saw nothing exchange hands? 
25 k Nothing. 
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1 Q, Now, on the ride back was there any talk between 
2 you and Mr. Smith about money? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. What did you do that weekend? 
5 K Sat at his house. 
6 ft Why? 
7 A. We were both broke, didn't have no money to 
8 go nowhere. 
9 $ When was your pay day? 
10 k That following Wednesday. 
11 MR. VAN SCIVER: That's all. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Skordas? 
13 
14 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. SKORDAS: 
16 I ft Mr. Montoya, do you remember talking with 
17 Det. Hodgkinson from the Midvale City Police about this 
18 matter? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you recall when that conversation took place? 
21 A. I believe it was the following Tuesday or Wednesday, 
22 I'm not quite sure. 
23 I Q. If I told you that I had a report in my hand 
24 from Det. Hodgkinson that was dated August 24th — 
25 A. That's probably right. 
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